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I. INTRODUCTION
The distribution and mishandling of unapproved or otherwise
restricted genetically-engineered (“GE”) crops can result in serious
financial losses for commodity crop market participants.1 These losses can
be long-lasting and severe for commodity crop producers (i.e., farmers).2
Since litigation involving GE crop contamination began appearing in U.S.
courts around the year 2000, judges, lawyers, and economists have
grappled with how to appropriately measure producers’ damages based
on sound econometric and economic analysis so that they can be
compensated for both the immediate and the future economic losses
caused by the contaminators’ allegedly tortious acts. 3 Incidents of GE crop
contamination have a continuing effect on commodity crop pricing long
after the contaminator has ceased its allegedly wrongful conduct. 4 Harm
to producers and other market participants will continue into the
indefinite future for a variety of reasons, such as the self-replicating
process and persistence in plant genetic material of GE crops, possibly
indefinitely, as well as the strict limits, including down to zero-tolerance
of unapproved GE traits set by commodity crop purchasers.5
To account for producers’ future economic loss from the present,
allegedly unlawful, GE crop contamination, the damages model must
include losses arising from the “price overhang.”6 Price overhang refers
to the phenomenon in which the price of a commodity, stock, product, or
See George A. Kimbrell & Aurora L. Paulsen, The Constitutionality of State-Mandated
Labeling for Genetically Engineered Foods: A Definitive Defense, 39 VT. L. REV. 341, 344 (2015)
(stating the contamination of non-genetically-engineered (“GE”) crops has caused U.S.
farmers billions of dollars in market losses).
2
See generally Hilary Weiss, Genetically Modified Crops: Why Cultivation Matters, 39 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 875, 877–79 (2014) (expressing that the economic losses resulting from the StarLink
scandal still have an effect on corn producers around the world today).
3
See Stephen M. Scanlon, Should Missouri Farmers of Genetically Modified Crops Be Held
Liable for Genetic Drift and Cross Pollination?, 10 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 10 (2003)
(introducing ways—under the law of nuisance, law of trespass, the dimensional test, and the
modified dimensional test—that farmers are able to recover for damages caused by genetic
contamination).
4
See generally Soil Association, UK, GE Crops Are Economic Disaster Shows New Report,
PSRAST (Sept. 25, 2016), http://www.psrast.org/geecondisast.htm [https://perma.cc/
2WXE-VR7M] (discussing a report concluding that GE crop contamination is the major cause
of the agricultural economy’s collapse).
5
See Adam W. Jones, What Liability of Growing Genetically Engineered Crops?, 7 DRAKE J.
AGRIC. L. 621, 627 (2002) (providing that Robert Frost’s quote “good fences make good
neighbours” does not apply to farmers because of the many ways crops can become
contaminated with GE crop material).
6
See generally Carl F. Jordan, Genetic Engineering, the Farm Crisis, and World Hunger, 52
BIOSCIENCE OXFORD J. 523, 523 (2002) (explaining that the more farmers produce, the lower
the prices are driven, which leads to large financial losses).
1
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other asset remains consistently below its previous price level following
the contamination event and long after the contaminator’s cessation of its
wrongful conduct.7 Inclusion of the price overhang effect in damages
calculations in GE crop contamination cases has gained increased
legitimacy and acceptance.8
This Article begins with an overview of major GE crop contamination
cases from 2000 through the present.9 Next, the Article covers the general
damages concepts related to market loss in GE crop contamination cases. 10
The Article concludes with a detailed discussion of the price overhang
effect from an econometric perspective, demonstrating this effect, and
confirming the thesis that for major contamination events, postcontamination prices have remained below the pre-contamination price
levels for several years.11
II. OVERVIEW OF GE CROP CONTAMINATION CASES
This Part reviews three significant GE crop contamination cases
demonstrating the slow, but steadily increasing, acceptance of the
inclusion of price overhang in damages models in these types of crop
contamination situations.12
A. In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation
Originally filed in 2000, In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation
(“StarLink”) was the first instance of private tort litigation involving GE
crop contamination.13 StarLink illustrates not only the appropriateness of
See
generally
Market
Overhang,
INVESTINGANSWERS,
http://www.investinganswers.com/financial-dictionary/stock-market/market-overhang3913 [https://perma.cc/5V47-ANQZ] (defining market overhang as a phenomenon where
investors put off buying shares of stock due to a belief that the stock’s price will continually
decline).
8
See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155 (2010) (including the
price overhang effect in the damages calculation).
9
See infra Part II (discussing the relevant GE crop contamination cases); see also In re
StarLink Corn Prods. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2002); In re Syngenta AG MIR 162
Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177 (D. Kan. 2015); In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 251
F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
10
See infra Part III (expanding on three economic concepts—price function, market loss,
and market efficiency—that can lead to damages to market participants resulting from a GE
contamination).
11
See infra Part IV (providing econometric models that illustrate the price overhang
effect).
12
See infra Parts II.A–C (analyzing three important GE cases).
13
See 212 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (discussing the fact that fifteen separately filed class action
cases were consolidated into this multidistrict litigation arising from the discovery of GE
StarLink corn in the U.S. food corn supply).
7
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expanding damages models to include the price overhang effect for
commodity market participants harmed financially by GE crop
contamination, but also the need to do precisely that if market participants
(i.e., farmers) are to be made financially whole from the harm arising from
the alleged misconduct.14 Damages models that include the price
overhang effect are the standard for an appropriate damages analysis that
is well-established in both the law and economic analyses.15
StarLink is the brand name of a genetically-engineered corn seed that
expresses a protein known as Cry9C. Cry9C is toxic to certain types of
insects, and thus functions as a GE alternative to chemical pesticides. 16
Indeed, the developmental goal of Cry9C was to engineer a protein that
could replace the need for chemical pesticides in treating crops. 17
Aventis AgroScience, Inc. (“Aventis”), together with Aventis
CropScience USA Holdings, Inc., genetically-engineered the corn seed
and applied for federal approvals of StarLink under the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) and the Federal
In 1998, the U.S.
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).18
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) approved StarLink for
commercial use only.19 That is, all grain grown from StarLink seeds could
be used only for domestic animal feed or for industrial purposes, and
importantly, could not be used as a human food source.20
The EPA, as a condition of its approval, required special procedures
to prevent StarLink from commingling with, and thus contaminating, the
remainder of the commodity corn supply. 21 Ordinarily, corn varieties
produced by thousands of farms are regularly commingled through
harvesting, storage, and shipment to grain elevators and, ultimately,

14
See id. at 838 (holding the plaintiffs could proceed in the lawsuit on the grounds of
negligence per se, public nuisance, and private nuisance).
15
See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 368 (4th ed. 2004).
16
See StarLink Corn Regulatory Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Apr. 2008),
https://www3.epa.gov/pesticides/chem_search/reg_actions/pip/starlink_corn.htm
[https://perma.cc/6EU7-4KVK] (noting that Cry9C is in a variety of StarLink’s GM corn
seed that acts as a plant-incorporated protectant).
17
See id. (stating that Cry9C acts as a pesticide).
18
See id. (reiterating that Aventis submitted data to the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) and applied for safety approvals of StarLink under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) and Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”).
19
See id. (stating that the EPA registered StarLink for commercial use only, given that
grain derived from StarLink was directed to industrial use or domestic animal feed).
20
See In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(explaining that the EPA found several attributes of Cry9C similar to common human
allergens, resulting in limited registration that prohibited its use for human consumption).
21
See id. (restating that the EPA required StarLink to follow special procedures despite
general practices in the corn industry).
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processors, which do not necessarily segregate specific corn varieties.22
Indeed, the ability to segregate GE seeds through identity preservation of
GE varieties is a costly and time-consuming requirement of properly
handling GE crops.23 Additionally, corn varieties within a farm regularly
cross-pollinate, unless specific steps are taken to prevent such crosspollination, as corn pollen has the ability to travel considerable distances
to other farms and crops, owing to various environmental factors. 24
Therefore, to prevent StarLink from working its way into the commodity
corn supply chain, the EPA required special segregation procedures for
StarLink cultivation, harvest, storage, and transport, and also required a
vast “buffer zone” around StarLink corn crops to prevent potential crosspollination with non-StarLink corn.25 The EPA also required Aventis to
inform farmers of the special procedures regarding segregation, use,
storage, and disposition of StarLink corn and to accept responsibility for
ensuring StarLink purchasers’ written agreement to such terms. 26
Despite the mandates and precautions, in the year 2000, StarLink corn
was found in food intended for human consumption. 27 This event
resulted in many food producers halting their domestic use of U.S. corn
entirely and replacing it with imported corn or corn substitutes. 28
Additionally, major importers of U.S. corn, such as South Korea and
Japan, followed suit and either terminated or limited U.S. corn imports.29
These occurrences had a direct and obvious negative affect on U.S. corn
markets.30 In turn, U.S. corn growers filed numerous lawsuits that were
22
See id. (providing common practices of farmers that do not have to segregate specific
corn varieties).
23
See Raymond Massey, Identity Preserved Crops, IOWA ST. U. (Aug. 2002),
https://www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/crops/pdf/a4-53.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P6W
-R8WW] (expressing that the identity preservation grain production requires a different
process that will require a higher standard of quality).
24
See In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834 (stating that corn pollen
can drift long distances, resulting in corn varieties cross-breeding with neighboring farms
regularly).
25
See id. (listing the special procedure requirements that the EPA required StarLink to
follow regarding segregation, use, storage, and disposition of corn).
26
See id. (explaining that StarLink had to inform farmers of the special procedure
requirements set forth by the EPA).
27
See id. at 835 (discussing the fact that multiple reports of human food products that
tested positive for Cry9C led to a wave of manufacturers issuing recalls for products
containing corn).
28
See id. (reiterating that Aventis’s application to cancel the limited registration of
StarLink products and fear of contamination led to U.S. food producers replacing U.S. corn
with imported corn or corn substitutes).
29
See id. (stating both Japan and South Korea, along with other foreign countries, have
either terminated or limited imports of U.S. corn).
30
See Ricardo C. Gazel & Russell L. Lamb, Will the Tenth District Catch the Asian Flu?, 83
ECON. REV.–FED. RES. BANK OF KANSAS CITY 9, 24 (1998) (expressing that Asia’s economic
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ultimately transferred by the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation
(“JPML”) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for
consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407.31
Defendants Aventis and the Advanta Group, which had acquired
Garst Seed Company, a licensee that produced and distributed the seeds,
moved to dismiss the growers’ claims for negligence per se, public
nuisance, private nuisance, and conversion. 32 Ultimately, the court denied
defendants’ dismissal motion as to all tort claims except conversion, and
ruled that plaintiffs could “proceed on the theory that defendants (1)
violated duties imposed by the limited registration [of StarLink]; (2) made
representations to StarLink growers that contradicted the EPA-approved
label; and (3) failed to inform parties handling StarLink corn downstream
of the EPA-approved warnings.”33 The court recognized that defendants
had a duty to ensure that StarLink did not enter the human food supply
and observed that liability would arise if plaintiffs established that
Aventis’s breach of that duty caused plaintiffs’ corn to be contaminated.34
Notably, the court cautioned that although plaintiffs alleged that the
defendants contaminated “the entire [U.S.] corn farming and production
chain,” recovery by any plaintiffs pursuant to a tort would depend on
their ability to prove “direct harm” to their own crops. 35 The court also

crisis will have a negative impact on the U.S. economy because Asia is responsible for more
than one-third of U.S. corn exports).
31
See In re StarLink Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d at 833 (stating that there were fifteen
separately filed cases consolidated for pretrial purposes); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012)
(describing the procedures for consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings).
32
See In re StarLink Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (stating that the defendants’
motion to dismiss was granted in regards to the claims for conversion and the violations of
the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, but denied for the claims of
negligence per se, public nuisance, and private nuisance).
33
Id. at 838.
34
See id. at 843 (acknowledging that Aventis’s duty to ensure StarLink did not enter the
human food supply was breached, causing the plaintiffs’ corn to be contaminated).
35
Id. See also id. at 842–43 (providing that although the defendants argued that the
plaintiffs had alleged only a market-wide harm, the court gave plaintiffs the benefit of the
ambiguity and “read the complaint to allege direct harm to plaintiffs’ corn, . . . a set of facts
that is consistent with plaintiffs’ allegations about the impact on the corn system as a
whole”). Given the market reality that cross-contamination affects or touches all crops
within a given crop market, tort theory should be construed to recognize the fact that harm
to the market establishes a direct harm to the producer. See Adam J. Levitt & Nicole
Negowetti, Agricultural “Market Touching”: Modernizing Trespass to Chattels in Crop
Contamination Cases, 38 U. HAW. L. REV. 409, 409 (2016) (discussing the need to expand the
trespass to chattels tort, in the face of modern commodity market realities, to include “virtual
touching” of crops arising from market-wide contamination incidents that systemically
affect crop values).
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expressly declined to determine whether defendants’ alleged acts could
also give rise to consequential damages.36
Not long after the motion to dismiss was largely denied, the farmer
class settled for over $110 million.37 Significantly, StarLink marked the first
time that plaintiffs’ lawyers working in tandem with their lead
economist—(in this case, Dr. Colin Carter, of the University of California,
Davis)—asserted agricultural market loss theories as the basis of their
damage modeling.38
Specifically, in StarLink, Dr. Carter used the efficient market
hypothesis in the commodity crop context, which enabled him to quantify
the market impact of the contamination on U.S. corn farmers. 39 Dr.
Carter’s analysis documented and assessed the flow of negative market
information to and from traders resulting from the StarLink
contamination and measured its impact on the futures pricing mechanism
that affects all U.S. corn farmers.40 Dr. Carter, as well as other researchers
he cited in his declaration, characterized the “U.S. corn market as an
efficient market,” noting that its “pricing is sensitive to information on
supply and demand” and that its “cash and . . . futures prices are highly
correlated through time.”41 Based on his analysis of the flow of StarLinkrelated market information, he was able to conclude that U.S. “corn
futures prices were depressed because of the risk of contamination in any
shipment originating in the United States[,] [and] [i]n turn, the[] lower
future prices would result in lower cash price quotes within the United
36
See In re StarLink Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d at 843 (stating that the determination
of consequential damages would be left for another day).
37
See Paul Elias, Biotech Firms Will Pay $110 Million to Settle StarLink Corn Lawsuit,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 7, 2003), http://cjonline.com/stories/020703/usw_biotech.shtml#.
V-ceKfkrLcu [https://perma.cc/3K84-YPMD] (providing that contemporaneously with the
StarLink corn farmers’ settlement, the defendants in that action also settled a smaller
consumer class action case brought on behalf of purchasers of food products containing
StarLink corn and those who may have been exposed to potential allergens therein, for $9
million).
38
See Decl. of Colin A. Carter at 9–10, In re StarLink Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (No. 1403) (introducing Dr. Colin Carter’s technique of the “price-quantity”
as an alternative agricultural market theory to estimate damages in the StarLink situation).
39
See generally Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV.
313, 318 n.18 (2012) (explaining the efficient market hypothesis—a market theory proposed
by economist Eugene Fama—which assumes that securities price trading in a liquid market
reflect all available information (positive and negative) at any given time, and are thus
perfectly priced based on that information).
40
See Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 1 (expressing that the prices paid to
growers for U.S. corn are determined by the commodity’s futures price—as established by
the Chicago Board of Trade—plus or minus the local basis).
41
Id. See also Philip Garcia et al., The Value of Public Information in Commodity Futures
Markets, 32 J. OF ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 559, 563–64 (2006) (finding that corn future prices are
“efficient” and that they react quickly to news events).
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States and reduced prices paid . . . to growers in the U.S. corn belt.”42
Notably, in addition to identifying the immediate and direct effect on the
prices U.S. farmers were able to receive for their corn crops, Dr. Carter also
concluded
that
“[t]here
is
little
doubt
that
actual
damages . . . lingered . . . and were most likely spread out over several
months.”43
B. In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation
In 2006, another substantial crop contamination event occurred in the
U.S., giving rise to In re Genetically Modified Rice Litigation (“GM Rice”),
wherein thousands of U.S. rice producers and dozens of rice-related
businesses brought claims against Bayer AG and several of its foreign and
domestic subsidiaries.44 The plaintiffs, in similar fashion to those in
StarLink, alleged that “the defendants contaminated the U.S. rice supply
with non-approved genetically modified strains of rice, thereby affecting
the market price for plaintiffs’ crops.”45 The rice strain at issue was a longgrain rice known as LLRICE 601 and was designed by Bayer to be resistant
to an herbicide trademarked as Liberty Link. This modification allowed
post-emergent treatment of LLRICE 601 rice fields with Liberty Link, thus
enhancing its efficacy as an herbicide.46 The rice strain was developed in
Europe and field-tested in the United States.47 Not only was LLRICE 601,
like the corn in StarLink, not approved for human consumption, but it was
not approved for any sort of commercial use or dissemination.48
On August 18, 2006, the U.S. Department of Agriculture announced
that trace amounts of LLRICE 601 had been detected in the U.S. rice
supply.49 In the days that followed, certain major importers of U.S. rice,
such as Japan and other Asian countries, reacted by banning the
importation of all long-grain rice produced in the United States.50 Other
Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 7.
Id. at 11.
44
See 251 F.R.D. 392, 393 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (stating that this multidistrict litigation
aggregated, for pretrial purposes, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, numerous, separately filed
class action cases arising out of the alleged LLRICE 601 and 604 contamination incidents,
each naming as defendants Bayer CropScience LP and numerous other Bayer entities).
45
Id. at 393.
46
See id. (noting that LLRICE 601 is a rice seed developed by Bayer CropScience designed
to be resistant to Liberty Link).
47
See id. (specifying that Bayer created LLRICE 601 through research in Europe and later
conducted field testing of the rice in the United States).
48
See id. (stating that at the time of contamination, LLRICE 601 was not approved for
human consumption).
49
Id.
50
See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 251 F.R.D. at 393 (stating on August 20, 2006,
Japan announced it would no longer import U.S. rice).
42
43
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countries, such as Russia, Canada, and Taiwan, imposed restrictions on
U.S. rice imports, while the European Union announced it would require
U.S. rice to be tested and certified as free of genetically modified traits.51
Accordingly, the export market for U.S. rice was substantially affected.52
Building upon the damages theory first devised and introduced in
StarLink, the plaintiffs in the GM Rice litigation alleged that “the
defendants’ activities caused a market loss injury to the U.S. rice market”
and, in support, pointed to the dramatic price drop that negatively
affected U.S. rice producers immediately after the Department of
Agriculture’s announcement.53 Significantly, this negative price impact,
in addition to harming the 2006 commodity rice crop, continued into the
2007 crop.54
Like Aventis in StarLink, Bayer tried to knock out plaintiffs’ claims in
GM Rice through a dismissal motion, but, like in StarLink, Bayer’s
dismissal motion failed and plaintiffs’ claims survived.55 The GM Rice
litigation then took an unusual procedural turn that, in hindsight, proved
to be in significant tension with the case’s ultimate resolution. 56 The judge
presiding over GM Rice denied class certification based on her
determination that “[i]ndividual circumstances affecting the calculation of
individual plaintiffs’ damages predominate over the common issues
presented in plaintiffs’ claims.”57 In many cases, denial of certification
results in the death of the action as a whole, but not here. 58
Based on the strong merits of the case and substantial damages
suffered by individual plaintiffs, GM Rice transformed from a class action
51
See id. (reiterating that three days after Japan’s announcement, the European Union
declared a new requirement that all incoming U.S. rice had to be tested and certified as free
of genetically modified traits).
52
See id. at 394 (furthering that shortly thereafter, it was disclosed that the LLRICE 604
trait had also been detected in the U.S. supply, therefore, increasing the scope of the
contamination and the damages arising).
53
See id. (acknowledging that the plaintiffs alleged the LLRICE contamination
announcement and the defendants’ actions caused the dramatic price drop).
54
See id. (noting that any rice producer who priced his or her 2006 or 2007 crop after
August 18, 2006, encountered economic harm throughout 2007).
55
See Amanda L. Kool, Halting Pig in the Parlor Patents: Nuisance Law as a Tool to Redress
Crop Contamination, 50 JURIMETRICS 453, 477 (2010) (analyzing that despite losing two claims,
the plaintiffs’ claims for negligence and private nuisance survived summary judgment).
56
See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 251 F.R.D. at 400 (denying the plaintiffs’ class
certification motion).
57
Id.
58
See Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 51, 51 n.4 (2005) (noting the certification of a class action is crucial in determining the
success or failure of the litigation); but see Kool, supra note 55, at 477 (providing that the first
two of five prescheduled test trials pertaining to LLRICE 601 contamination resulted in
verdicts without published opinions in which three plaintiffs were awarded approximately
$1.5 million).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 [2017], Art. 3

384

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

case into a mass tort case.59 Following a series of bellwether trials, each of
which resulted in either a plaintiff’s verdict or midtrial settlement—as
well as several state court trial victories—the Bayer defendants and the
GM Rice mass tort plaintiffs reached a $750 million settlement. 60 Further,
settlements in related state court actions brought the aggregate
settlements in all LLRICE contamination litigation close to $1.1 billion,
making the GM Rice litigation the largest and most successful GE crop
contamination case to date.61
C. In re Syngenta AG MIR Corn Litigation
Most recently, in the litigation styled In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn
Litigation (“Syngenta”), various groups of corn market participants
brought claims against multiple Syngenta entities alleging that they
suffered significant losses because of Syngenta’s release of a GE corn trait
known as MIR 162 into the U.S. commodity corn system. 62 Some corn
growers that did not use Syngenta’s product were infected with the GE

59
The primary difference between class action and mass tort litigation is that class action
litigation is representative litigation, while mass tort litigation is the aggregation and
coordination of hundreds—if not thousands—of individual cases. See generally NFL
Concussion Litigation, PAUL D. ANDERSON CONSULTING, LLC (Mar. 29, 2012),
http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=406 [https://perma.cc/U2QB-L8WV] (analyzing
the different doctrines). One instance where litigation may proceed as a mass tort rather
than a class action is when the damages being sought are inherently individualized in nature,
and thus may not readily satisfy the “predominance” requirement of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 23(b)(3) needed for certification as a class action. See Advisory Committee Note
to 1966 Amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (“A ‘mass accident’ resulting in injuries to
numerous persons is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the likelihood
that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, would
be present, affecting the individuals in different ways.”).
60
See Andrew Harris & David Beasley, Bayer Will Pay $750 Million to Settle Gene-Modified
Rice Suits, BLOOMBERG (July 1, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-0701/bayer-to-pay-750-million-to-end-lawsuits-over-genetically-modified-rice
[https://perma.cc/R2UH-FTRN] (reporting that Bayer AG resolved claims with about
11,000 U.S. farmers, agreeing to a $750 million settlement).
61
See A. Bryan Endres & Nicholas R. Johnson, $750 Million Settlement in GM Rice
Contamination, FARMDOC DAILY (July 8, 2011), http://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2011/07/
750-million-settlement-in-gm-r.html [https://perma.cc/WTA7-NYL9] (providing that the
$750 million voluntary settlement was an attempt to end future threat of litigation).
62
See Alison Rice, Corn Farmers Sue Syngenta over MIR 162 Corn, FARM J. (Sept. 25, 2016),
http://www.agweb.com/article/corn-farmers-sue-syngenta-over-mir-162-corn-/
[https://perma.cc/GJ5J-RNDT] (stating MIR 162 was commercially known as Agrisure
Viptera and was intended to make corn crops more resistant to certain pests); see also In re
Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1185–86 (D. Kan. 2015) (stating that
the three groups of plaintiffs who sued Syngenta were corn producers, non-producer corn
sellers, and milo producers).
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corn trait through cross-pollination from nearby fields. 63 In addition, the
MIR 162 corn commingled with GE-free corn in grain elevators and
storage facilities, ultimately leading to an infiltration of the general U.S.
commodity corn supply.64
At the time, one of the United States’s primary corn importers, China,
had yet to approve the use of MIR 162 and had in force a zero-tolerance
policy for unapproved GE traits.65 Accordingly, the contamination of the
U.S. commodity corn supply chain led to China’s essentially banning the
importation of all U.S. corn. 66 The complete disruption of corn trade with
China lasted for over a year.67 Furthermore, the contamination caused
trade disruptions that led to U.S. corn supply back-ups. The net effect of
the trade disruption was lower prices for all U.S. commodity corn, which
negatively affected corn producer income and profits.68
In Syngenta, the plaintiffs alleged that Syngenta’s liability arose from
its misleading statements regarding the importance of the Chinese market
to U.S. corn farmers—China was one of the top importers of U.S. corn—
and the prospects of Chinese approval of MIR 162, as well as from
Syngenta’s failure to ensure proper stewardship and channeling measures
that would have prevented the contamination of the U.S. corn supply with
MIR 162 before Chinese approval of the trait.69
As expected, Syngenta moved to dismiss all claims.70 In largely
sustaining the plaintiffs’ claims in the face of the defendants’ dismissal
motions, the Honorable John W. Lungstrum—the JPML transferee judge
for the litigation—took the significant step of recognizing, and in part
63
See In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1186 (reiterating the corn
of farmers who did not use Syngenta’s products gradually became contaminated with MIR
162 through cross-pollination).
64
See id. (establishing that both “Viptera- and Duracade-grown corn was commingled
with other [GE-free] corn in grain elevators and other storage facilities,” which led to the
infiltration of the general domestic corn supply).
65
See id. (showing that China had not yet approved the MIR 162 trait).
66
See id. (discussing the ban on all U.S. corn in China).
67
See id. at 1208 (demonstrating that the ban lasted over a year); see also Paul Minehart,
Syngenta Receives Chinese Import Approval for Agrisure Viptera ® Corn Trait, SYNGENTA (Dec. 22,
2014),
http://www.syngentacropprotection.com/news_releases/news.aspx?id=187482
[https://perma.cc/7EJV-RF64] (announcing the Chinese approval of the MIR 162 trait in
2014).
68
See In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1186 (discussing the
economic impact of losing the Chinese market).
69
See id. (describing the nature of the complaint). To be clear, the fact that the Syngenta
litigation is largely premised on allegations arising from Syngenta’s misleading statements
relating to the status of Chinese approval of MIR 162 corn, renders that case is far more akin
to a securities fraud or a market manipulation case than to a crop contamination case such
as StarLink or GM Rice. For purposes of the damages analyses and related discussions set
forth in this Article, however, there is no material difference.
70
See id. at 1187 (showing that Syngenta moved to dismiss all claims).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2017

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 51, No. 2 [2017], Art. 3

386

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

focusing on, the “relationship between the parties in an interconnected
market” and the effects of that interconnected market on the viability of
the plaintiffs’ claims.71 This recognition of an interconnected market
underscored the merits of the market loss damages theory first proposed
by the attorneys and expert in StarLink, because it established that, even
though corn farmers could not prove their own corn was contaminated
with the MIR 162 trait, the negative consequences from contamination of
the commodity supply chain still directly harmed them.72 The Syngenta
action remains pending.73
III. GENERAL ECONOMIC CONCEPTS RELEVANT TO GE CROP
CONTAMINATION CASES
The modern market reality is that introducing a restricted or
unapproved GE trait into a U.S. crop market, whether by cross-pollination
or commingling along the supply chain, results in a market-wide price
effect on the particular crop at issue. Such market-wide price effect results
in significant financial losses on market participants, particularly farmers,
whether or not they have ever produced GE varieties or have suffered
contamination from GE varieties.74 That is, because of the inherent commodity
nature of the products at question, market prices fall across the board, and
the loss of markets, especially export markets, is necessarily widespread
across all producers.75 Three core economic concepts—price function,
See id. at 1192 (reiterating the plaintiffs’ alleged facts).
See id. at 1189 (describing the relationship of the parties in that “[t]he parties were not
strangers, but rather were part of an inter-connected industry and market, with expectations
on all sides that manufacturers and growers and sellers would act at least in part for the
mutual benefit of all in that inter-connected web”); see also In re StarLink Prods. Liab. Litig.,
212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 838–43 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (discussing the economic loss doctrine).
73
See generally In re Syngenta AG MIR 162, No. 14-md-2591-JWL, 2016 WL 4705620, at *1
(D. Kan. Sept. 8, 2016) (observing the litigation is ongoing); see also In re StarLink Corn Prods.
Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. at 838–43 (exploring the economic loss doctrine). During the
pendency of this Article, Judge John Lungstrum certified a nationwide Lanham Act class, as
well as several statewide classes. In April 2017, he granted summary judgment in
defendants’ favor on the Lanham Act claim. The initial Syngenta MDL bellwether trial is
scheduled to commence in June 2017, while the initial bellwether trial in the Syngenta state
court actions pending in Minneapolis is scheduled to commence prior to that.
74
See generally In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1236 (mentioning
the market-wide decrease in the price of corn); see also Compensation Is Not Protection from GE
Contamination: CFS Comments to USDA Advisory Committee on Biotechnology and 21st Century
Agriculture, CTR. FOR FOOD SAFETY 56 (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.usda.gov/documents/
perrone-seiler-comments-behalf-oneil-cfs-82712.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4GHK-T7WM]
(discussing the economic and social impact of GE and non-GE contaminated items).
75
See What Drives Commodity Price Changes?, COMMODITY FACT (2016),
http://www.commodityfact.org/#issue1 [https://perma.cc/KX6Z-CBC9] (discussing the
market price trends of commodities).
71
72
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market loss, and market efficiency—explain how an incident of GE
contamination can cause all market participants, including farmers, to
incur damages.76
A. Price as a Function of Supply and Demand
Generally speaking, “[p]rice in [commodity markets] is derived by the
interaction of supply and demand.”77 That is, the “market price is
dependent upon both of these fundamental components of a market.” 78
Therefore, when supply or demand changes, from whatever causes and
no matter in which direction, so too will price. 79 For example, lower
demand for a commodity product leads to a surplus of the commodity in
the marketplace in the short run and results in lower prices for that
product to allow the producers to clear the market of the excess supply. 80
Accordingly, when a U.S. crop commodity’s demand reduces, it leads to
lower market prices for that particular crop variety.81 While there are
always slight shifts in the supply and demand for commodities, GE crop
contamination in a U.S. crop commodity market can substantially reduce
demand resulting in a corresponding drop in price for the entire U.S.

76
See infra Part III.A (discussing price function and supply and demand); see also infra Part
III.B (exploring market loss); infra Part III.C (discussing market efficiency).
77
How Supply and Demand Determine Commodities Market Prices, TRADINGCHARTS.COM,
http://futures.tradingcharts.com/learning/supply_and_demand.html [https://perma.cc/
AYJ4-AME6]. More specifically, “[c]orn prices throughout the United States are tied to the
Chicago Board of Trade Futures (CBOT) through the ‘basis’ (defined as the futures price
minus the local cash price).” Non-Producer Plaintiffs’ Amended Class Action Master
Complaint, at 80, In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., (D. Kan. May 29, 2015) (No. 14-md2591-JWL-JPO). Further, the “U.S. corn market is spatially integrated and informationally
efficient. Basis levels for separated markets are also closely linked. Events like trade
disruptions that affect the CBOT corn prices directly affect the price that U.S. corn farmers
receive for their corn.” Id.
78
How Supply and Demand Determine Commodities Market Prices, supra note 77.
79
See id. (describing the principle of supply and demand); see also What Drives Commodity
Price Changes?, supra note 75 (exemplifying the effect of supply and demand). Scholars in the
area have commented as follows:
As the G20 Study Group on Commodities noted: The large change in
physical supply and demand conditions provide plausible explanations
for commodity price swings . . . Moreover, the prices of commodities
that are only traded OTC . . . have risen as much as major commodity
index components. This may suggest that changes in physical demand
and supply, rather than growing financial investments, have been the
main drivers of commodity prices.
What Drives Commodity Price Changes?, supra note 75 (internal quotation marks omitted).
80
See generally id. (discussing the effect of supply and demand on commodity market
prices).
81
See generally id. (applying the principle of supply and demand to commodity prices).
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market of the affected crop variety.82 Such was the case after the StarLink
incident when U.S. corn market demand, and inherently price,
plummeted.83 One commodities market analyst, for example, recognizing
the “major impact” that StarLink had on demand for U.S. corn, noted:
While increased production elsewhere in the world can
reduce U.S. export demand slightly, it does not have a
major impact unless it is due to quality or other issues.
One such issue in 2000/01 was StarLink. StarLink
contamination shifted demand to other countries not due
to price but due to concerns that food products made
from U.S. supplies could be contaminated with StarLink
with an eventual need to be recalled from the market. 84
This unfortunate reality results in all U.S. crop market participants
incurring reduced prices for their crops due to the reduced demand and
backed-up supply.85
B. Market Loss
U.S. crop markets are commodity-based structures that include
millions of participants, all of which interconnect in a chain-like fashion. 86
Therefore, when GE crop contamination occurs in a particular U.S. crop
variety, all of the market participants that deal in the affected variety incur
real and significant economic damages in the form of lost market
opportunities, in addition to lower price.87 In GE contamination cases,
U.S. producers experience market loss harm in two primary ways: (1) the
GE contamination attaches a stigma to the entire market of the U.S. crop
at issue, resulting in a dilution of global confidence in its integrity and
causing a drop in demand for the U.S. crop; and (2) an associated
reallocation of market share occurs in which competitors begin to occupy
the market share positions that were held by U.S. producers before the GE
82
See, e.g., Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 1–2 (illustrating the effect of GE
contamination on commodity future prices).
83
See id. at 1 (showing the impact of contamination on the U.S. corn market).
84
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
85
See generally id. (describing the resulting impact of the contamination).
86
See Jorge Fernandez-Cornejo, The Seed Industry in U.S. Agriculture: An Exploration of Data
and Information on Crop Seed Markets, Regulation, Industry Structure, and Research Development,
U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 786 at 26–27 (2004),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/260729/aib786_1_.pdf [https://perma.cc/P97E-JLCR]
(providing an example of commodity-based structures in the modern history of the U.S. seed
industry market).
87
See Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 1 (discussing the damages to U.S. corn
producers).
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contamination.88 Once stigma attaches and the market is lost to
competitors, that market share is neither easily nor immediately
regained.89
1.

Stigma and Tainted Reputation Leading to Lower Demand

Unfortunately for some commodity market participants, the
decreased demand and market loss that necessarily results from the
stigma attached to a U.S. commodity crop variety after an incident of GE
contamination can be extensive and long in duration, resulting in a price
overhang effect (i.e., reduced demand and price over time) for
producers.90 In the case of StarLink, for example, the price overhang effect
caused by the reduction in demand, and thus price, continued long after
the incident.91 Japan, which at the time was the largest single foreign
purchaser of U.S. corn, not only took immediate action to restrict U.S. corn
from coming into the country after the initial StarLink contamination
announcement, reducing both demand and price for U.S. corn in the short
term, but also continued testing U.S. corn imports nine years after the
contamination incident.92 This continued testing substantially tainted the
reputation and added certain costs to the entire U.S. corn market over that
time period—despite the fact that “StarLink was planted on less than 1% of the
U.S. corn acreage.”93 Likewise, in GM Rice, the U.S. rice market
immediately sustained reduced demand, which, in turn, led to lower
prices, with the lower demand and prices continuing for many years after
the original incident.94 The plaintiffs’ expert in that case opined that
“[f]rom the perspective of the U.S. rice farmer, it could be ten years or
more before the stigma of the LLRICE contamination is ever removed.” 95

88
See In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1223 (D. Kan. 2015)
(listing the two types of harm as reputational and decrease in sales). Competitors are
typically foreign competitors or companies providing product substitutes. World Corn Trade,
USDA
(2016),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/crops/corn/trade.aspx#world
[https://perma.cc/AD4R-YB79].
89
See In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., 131 F. Supp. 3d at 1223 (addressing the effects
of reputational injury).
90
See Market Overhang, supra note 7 (explaining the principle of market overhang as it
applies to stock prices).
91
See Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 13 (expressing the price overhang effect in
StarLink).
92
See id. at 4 (showing the reduction of corn prices).
93
Supplemental Report of Colin A. Carter, at 10, In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig.,
251 F.R.D. 392 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (No. 1564-4) (emphasis added).
94
See 251 F.R.D. 392, 395 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (mentioning the effects through supply and
demand).
95
Supplemental Report of Colin A. Carter, supra note 93, at 9.
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Market Share Loss to Competitors Leading to Lower Demand

The price overhang effect also occurs when foreign competitors of U.S.
crop markets increase their share of the market by selling to countries that,
before the GE contamination, were buying from U.S. producers. 96 In a
commodities market, because of the country-specific regulatory controls
involved, new customers or importers do not necessarily formulate as
frequently as they may in other markets.97 Generally speaking, the
primary manner for a market participant to gain market share is to do so
by shifting demand at the expense of a competitor.98 For example, as seen
in StarLink, after the GE contamination announcement, world demand for
U.S. corn decreased because corn demand shifted to other countries. 99
Regaining this lost market share and recovering the demand that goes
with it in a previously affected U.S. crop variety is an uphill battle that can
take significant effort and considerable time.100 Shifts in demand due to
GE contamination are atypical in that they last much longer than those
based on typical economic factors, and thus the harm incurred by
producers is more extensive and longer in duration than for ordinary
market disruptions.101
Accordingly, it is paramount that such price overhang effects be
considered and included in GE crop contamination damages models to
fully compensate market participants for the market losses they
experience by way of either the stigma attached to the U.S. crop market at
issue or the market share lost to competitors as a result of the GE
contamination.102 Damages models would do this by measuring the
reduction in price over the time period affected.103 Since both the stigma
harm and the market loss harm result in lower demand and in turn lower
prices over time, such a measurement would properly allow for producers

96
See generally In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 251 F.R.D. at 397 (describing the
conditions of the market-loss subclass).
97
See generally International Trade:
An Overview, NAT’L AGRIC. LAW CTR.,
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/overview/international-trade/ [https://perma.cc/5RHSK8R3] (providing a general background on international agriculture trade).
98
See In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 251 F.R.D. at 393 (illustrating a shift in demand).
99
See id. (reiterating contamination impact); see also In re StarLink Prods. Liab. Litig., 212
F. Supp. 2d 828, 835 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (discussing global market impact due to U.S. corn
contamination).
100
See generally Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 5, 10 (showing the prolonged
extent of damages).
101
See Supplemental Report of Colin A. Carter, supra note 93, at 2 (reflecting the price
overhang effect from 2002–2010).
102
See Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 10 (illustrating the price overhang effect).
103
See id. at 10–11, 13 (assessing the extent of the damages).
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to recover damages pursuant to the price overhang effect to which they
continue to be subjected.104
C. Market Efficiency
A final important concept that is necessary to support a damages
model that addresses price overhang is market efficiency.105 “The concept
of efficiency as applied to commodity markets is . . . [similar to] the
concept . . . [referred] to [in] any other asset market. . . .”106 In short,
market efficiency implies that asset and futures prices incorporate all
As Algieri and Kalkuhl have
relevant information available.107
summarized:
Specifically, a market is efficient if it uses all of the
available information in setting futures prices so that
there is no opportunity for agents to profit from publicly
known information. The idea behind the concept of
efficiency is that investors [i.e., market participants]
process the information that is available to them and take
positions in response to that information, as well as to
their specific preferences. The market aggregates all the
information and reflects it in the price so that it is
impossible for agents to make economic profits [on
average over time] by trading on the basis of the existing
information set.108
As previously noted, U.S. crop markets are efficient markets in which
pricing is sensitive to information on supply and demand, and in which
cash and futures prices are highly correlated through time. 109
Accordingly, if markets are active, commodity-related information
quickly disseminates “among market participants who, upon trading,
determine a fair price.”110 Commodity market prices reflect changes and
See id. at 10 (reflecting the persistent nature of the damages).
See Bernardina Algieri & Matthias Kalkuhl, Back to the Futures: An Assessment of
Commodity Market Efficiency and Forecast Error Drivers, U. OF BONN, ZEF Discussion Papers on
Dev. Pol’y No. 195 at 3 (2014), http://www.zef.de/uploads/tx_zefnews/zef_dp_195.pdf
[https://perma.cc/99MV-4FC6] (discussing the principle of market efficiency).
106
Graciela Kaminsky & Manmohan S. Kumar, Efficiency in Commodity Futures 2 (Int’l.
Monetary Fund, Working Paper, No. 89/106, 1989).
107
See id. at 12 (discussing the “semi-strong” form of the test).
108
Algieri & Kalkuhl, supra note 105, at 3.
109
See Decl. of Colin A. Carter, supra note 38, at 1, 7 (reiterating the role of supply and
demand).
110
Nikolaos Milonas, The Effects of USDA Crop Announcements on Commodity Prices, 7 J. OF
FUTURES MKTS. 571, 571 (1987).
104
105
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take into account both underlying market fundamentals and market
events.111 In this regard, the GE contamination of a U.S. crop market
would be considered a market event. 112
IV. PRICE OVERHANG DAMAGES MODELING AND ECONOMETRIC ANALYSES
This Part presents illustrative examples of econometric models to
measure damages to crop growers caused by crop contamination from GE
material.113 These models specifically allow for empirical measurement of
the damages arising to crop growers and potentially other market
participants—including the damages that persist years after the actual
contamination as a result of the price overhang.114 In the economics and
finance literature, one of the commonly used methodologies to assess such
damages is the “event study.”115 This methodology identifies the amount
of changes in crop prices as a result of specific events by using the
relationship between the crop price series and a yardstick price series and
the timing of those events in question. 116 If choice of the yardstick series
is made correctly, this yardstick price series and the crop price series
should be cointegrated, to put it another way, they should move together
over time as a result of either the yardstick price series or the crop price
series being influenced by common market forces that affect cost and
demand factors, as well as changes in macroeconomic factors, such as
interest rates and inflation. 117 For example, by using an event study, one
can assess the changes in rice future prices as a result of a contamination
of LLRICE by using the relationship between rice future prices and a price
index that incorporates future prices of various grains.118
111
See id. (equating scheduled and non-scheduled economic announcements as market
events).
112
See id. (exemplifying crop announcements as market events).
113
See infra Part IV (discussing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (“ADF”) test).
114
See infra Part IV (examining the results of the author’s ADF test).
115
See Milonas, supra note 110, at 578 (discussing the methodology of event studies); see
also generally S.P. Khotari & Jerold B. Warner, Econometrics of Event Studies 2, 4, 5 (Ctr. for
Corp. Governance Tuck Sch. of Bus. at Dartmouth, Working Paper, 2006),
http://www.bu.edu/econ/files/2011/01/KothariWarner2.pdf [https://perma.cc/K93AHDYN] (explaining background information on how an event study operates).
116
See Milonas, supra note 110, at 578 (explaining the relation of price behavior to the event
study methodology).
117
See Rodney G. Robenstein & Walter N. Thurman, Health Risk and the Demand for Red
Meat: Evidence from Futures Markets, 18 REV. OF AGRIC. ECON. 629, 632 (1996) (discussing the
influence of interest rates and inflation); see also C. Alexander, Optimal Hedging Using
Cointegration,
PHIL.
TRANS.
R.
SOC.
LOND.
A
2039–41
(1999),
http://www.carolalexander.org/publish/download/JournalArticles/PDFs/PhilTrans_35
7_1758.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9D7-2SF5] (providing a definition of cointegration).
118
See, e.g., Robenstein & Thurman, supra note 117, at 633 (conducting an analogous study
using red meat prices).
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One requirement of conducting an event study is that the rice futures
prices should be non-stationary; in other words, the LLRICE
contamination has a permanent effect on the rice future prices. 119
Similarly, the grain future price index should also be non-stationary, as
well as cointegrated with the rice future prices.120 This means that any
common factors that would impact these two series should have a
permanent effect in both.121 This statistical property is tested for using
standard statistical software, and these tests are the backbone of much
modern research into asset prices.122

To confirm that the rice future prices and the grains future price index
series are non-stationary, we conducted the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(“ADF”) test, which is one of the standard tests for stationarity of a time

See Milonas, supra note 110, at 578 (finding future prices to be non-stationary).
See generally id. (exemplifying how commodity prices are non-stationary in event study
tests).
121
See Shu-Ling Chen et al., What Drives Commodity Prices? (Auburn U. Dept. of Econ.,
Working Paper No. 2010-05, 2010), http://www.cla.auburn.edu/econwp/archives/2010/
2010-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9EW-562E] (illustrating the role of multiple factors in
cointegration tests).
122
See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 INT’L
ECON. REV. 1, 2–3 (1969) (discussing stock dividends); see also John J. Binder, The Event Study
Methodology Since 1969, 11 REV. OF QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 111, 126 (1998) (summarizing
the use of statistical methodologies); Robenstein & Thurman, supra note 117, at 630
(discussing red meat future prices).
119
120
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series.123 The null hypothesis in this case is that each one of the rice future
price series and the grains future index series is non-stationary.124 We
calculated the ADF test statistic for the rice future prices to be 1.859 and
for the grains future index to be 2.965, each of which is greater than the 5
percent critical ADF value of -2.876, indicating that we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of non-stationarity for either of these price series.125
To test whether the rice future prices and grains future price index are
cointegrated, we conducted the Johansen’s Maximum Likelihood test. 126
The results of this test suggest that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating
vector should be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance (since the
trace statistic is 26.884, which is greater than the 5 percent critical value of
15.41), whereas the null hypothesis of one cointegrating vector should not
be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance (since the trace statistic is
2.95, which is less than the 5 percent critical value of 3.76).127 Therefore,
these two series are cointegrated; in other words, they move together and
do not diverge from each other too much in the long run.128

See Levitt-Lamb, Rice Future Prices vs. Grains Future Price Index (showing the results of
the author’s ADF test). This graph is an original adaptation of data from the Chicago Board
of Trade and the Commodity Research Bureau. See also Rough Rice (Globex) Futures Charts,
TRADINGCHARTS.COM, http://futures.tradingcharts.com/chart/ZR/M?anticache=14774102
08 [https://perma.cc/J4RA-5WE6] (citing to the rough rice future price index spanning from
2008–2016);
Grains
Future
Price
Index,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
http://ftp.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/statab/131ed/tables/12s07
35.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB36-FDS2] (reflecting the grains and oilseeds futures price index
spanning from 1990–2010); What’s the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test?, ABOUT, INC. (July 8,
2015),
http://economics.about.com/cs/economicsglossary/g/augmented.htm
[https://perma.cc/66NG-HXX2] (clarifying the definition of the ADF test).
124
See Levitt-Lamb, supra note 123 (hypothesizing the grains future price index to be nonstationary). In statistical terms, the statement being tested is called the “null hypothesis.”
See Martyn Shuttleworth, Null Hypothesis, EXPLORABLE, https://explorable.com/nullhypothesis [https://perma.cc/MF87-V4F5] (explaining the concept of a null hypothesis). In
this case, the statements being tested are whether each one of the rice future price series and
the grains future index series is non-stationary. See Levitt-Lamb, supra note 123 (providing
statistical representation of a future price index). In general, this tests whether any external
shocks, such as contamination announcements, will have a permanent effect in rice future
prices and grains future index series. Id.
125
See Levitt-Lamb, supra note 123 (showing the rice and grains future price indices).
126
See Erik Hjalmarsson & Par Osterholm, Testing for Cointegration Using Johansen
Methodology When Variables Are near-Integrated 5–6 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
07/141, 2007) (discussing how the Johansen’s Maximum Likelihood test involves multiple
statistical tests, which start with the null hypothesis of having no cointegrating factor
between the rice future prices and grains future price index series). If this null hypothesis is
rejected, the next test is performed with the null hypothesis of having one cointegrating
factor. Id. If this null hypothesis cannot be rejected, it can be concluded that the rice future
prices and grains future price index series are cointegrated. Id.
127
See Levitt-Lamb, supra note 123 (showing the authors’ conclusions).
128
See id. (drawing a conclusion based on the authors’ findings).
123
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The ADF test was also conducted to determine whether the one-week
returns of the rice future prices and the one-week returns of the grain
future price index are non-stationary.129 If the one-week returns of each
of these two series are stationary, that is to say they have constant mean
and variations over time, we can run a regression to explain rice future
prices with grain future prices, using these stationary series to avoid the
potential problem of overfitting. 130 Based on this analysis’s calculations,
we determined that the ADF test statistic for the one-week returns of the
rice future prices was -15.672, and for the one-week returns for the grains
future index was -15.033—each of which is less than the 5 percent critical
ADF value of -2.876, indicating that we should reject the null hypothesis
of non-stationarity for the one-week return series for rice future prices and
grains future price index.131 Therefore, the one-week returns of the rice
future prices and the one-week returns of the grain future price index are
stationary, meaning that they have a constant mean and variance, so that
any disturbance to the series, such as the presence of GE contamination
and the resulting drop in demand, and thus price, has only a temporary
effect on the one-week return series, meaning the series reverts back to
their means after the disturbance.132 Even though these one-week return
series will revert back to their means, the disturbance will have a
permanent effect on the non-stationary series of the levels of rice future
prices and the grain future price index.133
After verifying that the rice future prices and grains future price index
series are non-stationary and cointegrated, and the one-week return series
for both of these prices are, in turn, stationary, the relationship was
estimated between the two to understand how GE events affect the oneSee infra Part IV (providing the authors’ ADF findings); see also Levitt-Lamb, supra note
123 (depicting the authors’ outcomes).
130
See infra Part IV (discussing the authors’ results). Overfitting can result in regressions
of non-stationary series on each other.
See Overfitting, INVESTOPEDIA (2016),
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/overfitting.asp [https://perma.cc/P33U-LQ2Z]
(defining overfitting). Such regressions are called spurious regressions in the econometrics
literature. See David E. A. Giles, Spurious Regressions with Time-Series Data: Further
Asymptotic Results, U. OF VICTORIA, B.C., DEP’T OF ECON. 1, http://web.uvic.ca/
~dgiles/blog/spurious.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9D7M-JLNJ]
(exploring
spurious
regressions).
131
See Levitt-Lamb, supra note 123 (showing the results of the ADT test).
132
See Jeffrey Parker, Regression with Nonstationary Variables 65 (2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Reed College) (Sept. 29, 2016), www.reed.edu/
economics/parker/312tschapters/S13_Ch4.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VJQ-73DN] (stating
the tendency of a stationary variable is to revert back to its means after a disturbance).
133
See
Trend-Stationary
vs.
Difference-Stationary
Process,
MATHWORKS,
https://www.mathworks.com/help/econ/trend-stationary-vs-difference-stationary.html
[https://perma.cc/6W4D-UMVV] (explaining that time series with stochastic trends have
permanent effects from a shock).
129
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week returns of rice future prices in the market by running the following
log-log regression model:
݃ܮሺܴܴ݁݁ܿ݅݊ݎݑݐሻ ൌ ߚ  ߚଵ ݃ܮሺܴ݁ݏ݊݅ܽݎܩ݊ݎݑݐሻ  ߜଵ ܦ௨ଶ  ߜଶ ܦெଶ.134

The parameter β1 measures the relationship between one-week returns in
rice future prices and one-week returns in the grains future index. The
variables DAug2006 and DMar2007 take the value of one during the weeks of
the announcements of LLRICE contamination in August 2006 and March
2007, respectively; otherwise these indicator variables take the value of
zero. The parameters of interest in this event study are δ1 and δ2, which
measure the effects of contamination announcements on the returns of rice
future prices.
The results of the regression estimating the effects of the
contamination announcements on the returns of rice future prices are
reported in the table below.135

134
See A. Joseph Guse, Log-Level and Log-Log Transformations in Linear Regression Models
(2012), http://home.wlu.edu/~gusej.econ398/notes/logRegressions.pdf [https://perma.cc
/R7B3-Q34K] (showing the log-log regression model used). A model is characterized as
“log-log” if both the dependent variable and the independent variables or regressors are
measured as logarithms of the variable of interest. Id. This means that the coefficients on
the independent variables may be interpreted as the effect, in percentage terms, on the
dependent variable from a one percent change in the regressors. See Interpreting Coefficients
in Regression with Log-Transformed Variables, CORNELL STAT. CONSULTING UNIT (June 2012),
https://www.cscu.cornell.edu/news/statnews/stnews83.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G33BNE4G] (explaining how regression equations can change). Economists refer to such
coefficients as elasticities. Reem Heakal, Economics Basics: Elasticity, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/economics/economics
4.asp
[https://perma.cc/HU7Q-MWFS] (defining elasticity). Elasticities are “unit free,” meaning
that they express a relationship that is independent of the units of measure. See John Black
et al., A Dictionary of Economics:
Unit-free Measure (3d ed. 2009),
http://www.oxfordreference.com/oso/viewentry/10.1093$002facref$002f9780199237043.0
01.0001$002facref-9780199237043-e-3255 [https://perma.cc/R73Y-JQE5] (furthering the idea
of “unit-free” measure).
135
Rice Regression Results (table).
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Rice Regression Results
Parameters 1
Return in Grains Future Price Index

Coefficient Std. Error

t-Value

0.246

0.075

3.260

August 2006

-0.073

0.035

-2.060

March 2007

-0.019

0.035

-0.540

Announcement indicators

R2

0.04

F-Statistic

3.79

Number of Observations
Date Range

360
July 2001 through June 2008

Notes:
1 The coefficient estimate for the intercept is not shown in the table.

These results suggest that there is a positive and statistically
significant relationship between returns in the grains future price index
and returns in rice future prices. The coefficients on the announcement
indicator variables measuring the effect of these announcements on
returns in rice future prices are important results from this regression. If
these coefficients are statistically significant and negative, they indicate
that returns in rice future prices are lower as a result of the effects of these
announcements than would have been predicted in the absence of these
announcements. Of these two indicator variables, only one is statistically
significant and negative, at -0.073, indicating that returns in rice future
prices were 7.1 percent lower due to the contamination announcement of
LLRICE in August 2006.136 The March 2007 indicator coefficient is
negative; however, it is not statistically significant. Therefore, the rice
future prices went down by 7.1 percent in one week after the
contamination announcement on August 18, 2006. Since the rice future
price series is non-stationary, this 7.1 percent decrease in the series will
not be recovered in the long run until another shock results in a
statistically significant disturbance in the series. This 7.1 percent price
decline is the measure of the price overhang resulting from the statistical
analysis presented here.
In the second example, an event study was implemented to measure
the reduction in corn prices after the Washington Post’s September 18, 2000
This interpretation is subject to a slight adjustment due to the logarithmic form of the
returns in rice future prices used in the regression model: -7.1 percent is calculated by exp(0.73-(0.5*0.035^2))-1. See Peter E. Kennedy, Estimation with Correctly Interpreted Dummy
Variables in Semilogarithmic Equations, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 801, 081 (1981).

136
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report that StarLink had been detected in taco shells. 137 In this case, we
only had access to the Producer Price Index (“PPI”) series for corn.138
Instead of using the grains future price index as was used for the LLRICE
case, the PPI series was used for sorghum, which is a close substitute for
corn.139 Therefore, the sorghum PPI series is used as a yardstick PPI series
for corn.140 As shown in the chart figure below, the PPI series for corn and
sorghum are very similar.141 Indeed, the correlation coefficient for these
series is ninety-eight percent.142

137
See Marc Kaufman, Biotech Critics Cite Unapproved Corn in Taco Shells, WASH. POST (Sept.
18,
2000),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2000/09/19/biotechcritics-cite-unapproved-corn-in-tacho-shells/e7973551-d51
[https://perma.cc/49WERBRU] (providing the group that had the taco shells tested asked the FDA to recall the
products immediately).
138
See Producer Price Index by Commodity for Farm Products: Corn (WPU012202), U.S.
BUREAU OF LABOR STAT. (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.fred.stlouis.org/series/WPU012202
[https://perma.cc/9REC-3PYN] (previewing the Producer Price Index (“PPI”) series for
corn).
139
See Corn Agronomy: Sorghum, U. OF WIS. (Aug. 23, 2012), https://www.corn.
agronomy.wisc.edu/Crops/Sorghum [https://perma.cc/WN42-S3C2] (highlighting that
sorghum is a high dry matter and a short-day plant like corn).
140
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 605–07, 611 (West Publishing Co., 1994) (analyzing two different methods of
measurement: “yardstick” and “before-and-after”).
141
See Producer Price Index by Commodity for Farm Products: Corn (WPU012202), supra note
138 (reflecting the price of corn from January 1995 to July 2006); see also Producer Price Index
by Commodity for Farm Products: Sorghum, (WPU012205), U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://fred.stlouis.fed.org/series/WPU012205
[https://perma.cc/2CDQ-73MM]
(reflecting the price of sorghum from January 1995 to July 2006).
142
See Producer Price Index by Commodity for Farm Products: Sorghum, (WPU012205), supra
note 141 (showing the correlation coefficient between corn and sorghum).
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index by
Commodity for Farm Products: WPU012202 for Corn, WPU012205 for
Sorghum
The first step in an event study is to check whether the corn PPI and
sorghum PPI series are non-stationary by conducting the ADF test.143 The
ADF test statistic for the corn PPI to be -1.711 and for the sorghum PPI
series to be -1.524, each of which is greater than the 5 percent critical ADF
value of -2.887, indicating that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for
either of these price series cannot be rejected.144 That is, the series are nonstationary, meaning that any disturbance will not revert back to the mean
relationship over time, but rather persist in the series.145 Thus, in thinking
about damages measures for growers injured by a GE contamination
event in this market, the injury persists for a long time period, thus
143
See Yin-Wong Cheung & Kon S. Lai, Lag Order and Critical Value of a Modified DickeyFuller Test, 57 OXFORD BULL. OF ECON. & STAT. 411, 411 (1995) (defining the ADF test as a test
that examines the null hypothesis of a unit root against stationary alternatives). “[T]he null
hypothesis maintained is a nonstationary process, empirical failures to find stationary may
reflect the power of the test.” Id.
144
See What’s the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test?, supra note 13 (“[T]he [augmented] DickeyFuller test is used to determine whether a unit root, a feature that can cause issues in
statistical inference, is present in an autoregressive model.”).
145
See Parker, supra note 132, at 65 (asserting that the tendency to revert back to the mean
is central to the Dickey-Fuller test).
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necessitating the consideration and calculation of these “price overhang”
damages.146 The ADF test was also conducted to determine whether onemonth differences for the corn PPI and one-month differences for the
sorghum PPI are non-stationary.147 The ADF test statistic for one month
differences for the corn PPI was -9.063 and for one-month difference for
the sorghum PPI was -9.525, each of which is less than the 5 percent critical
ADF value of -2.887, indicating that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity
for one-month differences for both corn PPI and sorghum PPI series
should be rejected.148 That is, these series are stationary, so that they revert
back to their mean levels following a shock.149 This phenomenon, in which
the level of the series is non-stationary, but the first-difference (i.e., the
change from month to month) is stationary, is a common pattern for
economic time series, and such series are referred to as first-difference
stationary.150
To test whether the corn and sorghum PPI series are cointegrated, the
Johansen’s Maximum Likelihood test was conducted.151 The results of this
test suggest that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector should be
rejected at the 5 percent level of significance, since the trace statistic of
30.574 is greater than the 5 percent critical value of 15.41. 152 This means

146
See Overhang, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/overhang.asp
[https://perma.cc/453U-V6T3] (defining overhang as “a measure of the potential dilution
to which a common stock’s existing shareholders are exposed due to the potential that stockbased compensation will be awarded to executives, directors[,] or key employees of the
company”).
147
See Parker, supra note 132, at 65 (explaining that the basis of the ADF test is that the
tendency of stationary variables is to revert back to the mean).
148
See id. (claiming that if the calculated test statistic is less than the negative critical value,
the null hypothesis is rejected).
149
See id. (“This tendency to revert back to the mean is the intuitive basis for the oldest and
most basic test for stationarity: the Dickey-Fuller test.”).
150
See The Only Hope for Business/Economic Forecasting: Stationary Stochastic Processes,
QUANTITATIVE & APPLIED ECON. (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.espin086.wordpress.com/tag/
stationary-process/ [https://perma.cc/7QRM-E8LB] (“If the first difference of a stationary
time series is stationary the[n] it is said to be integrated of order 1 or I(1).”). For example,
taking the first difference of a non-stationary series that increases by a constant amount over
time yields a stationary series with a constant mean that is equal to the amount the nonstationary series increases.
151
See Gerald P. Dwyer, The Johansen Tests for Cointegration 1 (Apr. 2015),
https://www.jerrydwyer.com/pdf/Clemson/Cointegration.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9RFSYUS] (explaining that “[t]he Johansen test and estimation strategy—maximum likelihood—
makes it possible to estimate all cointegrating vectors when there are more than two
variables”).
152
See id. at 4 (providing that the first test is the test of the null hypothesis of no
cointegration against that of the alternative of cointegration).
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that the two series have a significant statistical relationship, so movements
in one series are likely to predict movements in the other series.153
After verifying that the corn PPI and sorghum PPI series are nonstationary and cointegrated, and the one-month differences for both of
these series are stationary, the following log-log regression model was run
to measure the amount by which corn prices were permanently lower as a
result of the contamination event in question, and the resulting drop in
market demand:
݃ܮ൫݊ݎܥ ൯ ൌ ߚ  ߚଵ ݃ܮ൫ܵ݉ݑ݄݃ݎ ൯  ߜଵ ܦ௨௧ Ǥ
The variables CornDiff and SorghumDiff indicate one-month differences of
corn PPI and sorghum PPI series, respectively.154 The parameter β1
measures the relationship between one-month differences in corn PPI and
one-month differences in sorghum PPI series. The variable Dannouncement
takes the value of one in October 2000, the month immediately following
the announcement of StarLink contamination; otherwise, this indicator
variable takes the value of zero. The parameter of interest in this event
study is δ1, which measures the effect of the contamination announcement
on the one-month differences in corn PPI series.
The results of the regression estimating the effect of the contamination
announcement on the one-month differences in corn PPI series are
reported in the table below.155
Corn Regression Results 1
Parameters 1
One month differences in Sorghum PPI Series

Coefficient Std. Error

t-Value

1.000

0.042

23.720

-0.071

0.037

-1.930

Announcement indicator
October 2000
R2
F-Statistic
Number of Observations
Date Range

0.80
283.84
144
Jan 1995 through Dec 2006

Notes:
1 The coefficient estimate for the intercept is not shown in the table.

See Hjalmarsson & Osterholm, supra note 126, at 5–6 (describing the Johansen’s
Maximum Likelihood test).
154
See Guse, supra note 134 (providing the log-log regression model used). The authors
are inputting CornDiff in for the y value in the formula and SorghumDiff in the x1 variable in the
formula.
155
Corn Regression Results 1 (table).
153
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The results suggest that there is a positive and statistically significant
relationship between the one-month differences in corn PPI series and the
one-month differences in sorghum PPI series. The coefficient on the
announcement indicator variable, the empirical analog to the theoretical
coefficient referred to as δ1 above, which measures the effect of the
announcement on one-month differences in corn PPI series, is one
important result from this regression. This coefficient is statistically
significant and negative, at -0.071, indicating that one-month differences
in corn PPI series were seven percent lower due to the StarLink
contamination announcement.156 Therefore, the corn PPI series went
down by seven percent in one month after the contamination
announcement. Since the corn PPI series is non-stationary, this seven
percent decrease in the series will not be recovered in the long run until
another shock results in a statistically significant disturbance in the series.
This highlights the need to account for price-overhang damages arising
from GE contamination when calculating damages to market participants.
As explained above, the sorghum PPI series is used as a yardstick PPI
series for corn.157 In addition to the event study methodology, both corn
and sorghum PPI series can be used in a regression model to estimate the
but-for corn PPI values—the corn PPI values in the absence of any
contamination announcement.158 The difference between the but-for corn
PPI and the observed corn PPI values is the effect of the contamination
announcement on corn PPI values. This methodology is called a yardstick
analysis.159
Because sorghum and corn are close substitutes in both production
and consumption, both crops are influenced by the same supply and
demand factors.160 Therefore, in the regression model, the natural
logarithm of the sorghum PPI series is the only explanatory variable.161 To
measure the effect of contamination announcement on corn PPI values, an
156
See Kaufman, supra note 136 (highlighting when the StarLink contamination
announcement was made). Similar to the rice regression, this interpretation is subject to a
slight adjustment due to the logarithmic form of the regression model. Authors’ Table, supra,
note 135.
157
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 140, at 605–06 (explaining the “yardstick” method of
measurement).
158
See Guse, supra note 134 (giving the log-log regression model).
159
See HOVENKAMP, supra note 140, at 605–06 (furthering the discussion of yardstick
measurement).
160
See, e.g., Five-Year Global Supply and Demand Projections, INT’L GRAINS COUNCIL 19 (Dec.
2014),
https://www.igc.int/en/downloads/grainsupdate/igc_5yrprojections2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/796T-G979] (providing an example of the higher demand in China for
sorghum).
161
See Guse, supra note 134 (giving the log-log regression model used). The authors used
the sorghum PPI series as the explanatory variable.
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indicator variable that covers the period from the announcement day
through the end of the analysis period is used. By using these variables,
the following regression model is estimated:
݃ܮሺ݊ݎܥሻ ൌ ߚ  ߚଵ ݃ܮሺܵ݉ݑ݄݃ݎሻ  ߜଵ ܦ௨௧ௗ Ǥ ͳʹ
The variables Corn and Sorghum indicate the corn PPI and sorghum PPI
series, respectively. The parameter β1 measures the relationship between
the corn PPI and the sorghum PPI series. The variable Dannouncement period
takes the value of one from October 2000—the month immediately
following the announcement of StarLink contamination—through
December 2006; otherwise, this indicator variable takes the value of zero.
The primary parameter of interest in this yardstick analysis is δ1, which
measures the effect of the contamination announcement on the corn PPI
series. In the but-for world—when there is no GE contamination event
and thus the indicator variable Dannouncement period is zero—corn PPI values
are estimated by adding the estimate of β0 to the value obtained by
multiplying the estimate of β1 by the natural logarithm of sorghum PPI
values.
The results of the regression estimating the effect of the contamination
announcements on the corn PPI series are reported in the table below. 163
Corn Regression Results 2
Parameters 1
Sorghum PPI Series

Coefficient Std. Error

t-Value

1.025

0.018

56.630

-0.073

0.008

-9.400

Announcement period indicator
October 2000 through December 2006
R2
F-Statistic
Number of Observations
Date Range

0.96
1,798.96
144
Jan 1995 through Dec 2006

Notes:
1 The coefficient estimate for the intercept is not shown in the table.

The results suggest that there is a positive and statistically significant
relationship between the corn PPI series and the sorghum PPI series, as
162
See Guse, supra note 134 (giving the generic log-log regression model used throughout
the study). In this specific regression model, the authors put Corn for the y-value, Sorghum
for the x-value, and the announcement day through the end of the analysis period for D. The
following subsequent unfootnoted sentences represent an explanation of the formula found
from this source.
163
Corn Regression Results 2 (table). The following subsequent unfootnoted material
represents the authors’ interpretation of the table.
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the two series are cointegrated. The coefficient on the announcement
period indicator variable measuring the effect of the announcement on the
corn PPI series is one important result from this regression. This
coefficient is statistically significant and negative, at -0.073, indicating that
the corn PPI series were 7.1 percent below what it would have been in the
but-for world as a result of the contamination announcement for
StarLink.164 This estimate is nearly the same as the seven percent estimate
of the event study methodology, confirming the validity of these two
approaches in estimating the price overhang effect of the contamination
announcement in corn PPI series.
V. CONCLUSION
In agricultural commodity markets, shifts in demand and supply are
propagated across the entire market because of the commodity nature of
the product. Shifts in demand can result in large price changes owing to
the rigidity, that is, the inelasticity, of supply. In the case of supply chain
contamination caused by the presence of GE plant material, the resulting
drop in demand has been shown to be persistent in the marketplace, as
buyers, especially importers of U.S. commodities, are hesitant to reopen
markets after a GE contamination event. This Article demonstrates that
sound econometric analysis confirms that, for two major GE
contamination events, the price overhang effect is significant, both
economically and statistically. Thus, accounting for damages attributable
to the price-overhang effect is critical in restoring market participants to
the same level of well-being that would have prevailed in a world absent
the GE contamination and is, moreover, crucial to consider in any
damages modeling or related analyses in litigation arising out of these
types of market-shifting contamination events.

164
Similar to the previous regression models, this interpretation is subject to a slight
adjustment due to the logarithmic form of the regression model.
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